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40 Abstract
The interdependence between the regulatory capital ratio and macroeconomic indicators, 
with reference to the phenomena cyclicality and pro-cyclicality is a widely emphasized 
disadvantage of the capital adequacy concept. Redesign of the aforementioned concept 
towards the countercyclical capital requirements is a kind of recognition of the creators 
of the Basel standards of the previous oversights in its development. This paper aims to 
explore empirically the direction, intensity and significance of endogenous and exogenous 
determinants of the changes in banks’ capital buffers by taking into consideration both 
the impact of the macroeconomic properties and the bank-specific characteristics of 
South-Eastern Europe. More than 80 commercial banks in the period from 2000-2010 have 
been encompassed by the research. Use of a dynamic panel analysis led to the conclusion 
that the bank capital buffers decreased during the observed period, with the exception 
of certain years during the economic expansion, which confirms the appropriateness of 
regulatory requirements considering the countercyclical capital buffers. Nevertheless, it 
might be that capital building and spending in the future will not follow the pattern from 
the last decade due to the specificities of the observed period, as well as the banking 
sector ownership transformations, economic and credit growth as well as asset prices 
growth in the post-transitional period, and finally, the real crisis which spilled over onto 
the financial sectors. 
Keywords: bank capital buffers, cyclicality, commercial banks, South-Eastern Europe
1 INTRODUCTION
The capital requirements regulation for banks, in common with the practice of referring 
to capital adequacy as the ultimate measure of the banking stability, has persisted as the 
key instrument of prudential oversight worldwide for a more than two decades, despite 
criticisms from both the academic community (Daníelsson et al., 2001; Rodríguez, 2003; 
Saidenberg and Schuermann, 003; Benston, 007; Moosa, 00) and the banking lobbies 
(Herring, 007; Kane, 007a, b). The phenomena of capital requirements cyclicality and 
pro-cyclicality, among other controversies, are rather important points of reference when 
the adequacy of this regulatory concept is being disputed (Jackson et al., 1999). While 
cyclicality stands for macroeconomic impacts on a bank’s performance, pro-cyclicality 
implies a bank’s reaction to the macroeconomic environment which amplifies macroeco-
nomic fluctuations (Marcucci and Quagliariello, 2008:47).
Examinations intent on determining the implications of capital requirements for the size 
of banking intermediation and which directly or indirectly tackled the question of the 
macroeconomic consequences of the observed regulatory measure long dominated resear-
ches on the effects of capital requirements implementation. Moreover, in the first decade 
of the capital adequacy standard implementation in practice the relationship between the 
capital requirements and the volume as well as the structure of banking activities was at 
the centre of research. In fact there was an endeavour to explain the credit contraction 
recorded at the beginning of the 1990s in the countries that signed the Basel Accord by the 
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4the hypothesis of the financial accelerator induced by bank capital) provided the impulse 
that led to the credit crunch, a regulatory mechanism that had pro-cyclical effects, was 
examined in many empirical investigations. Most research on the macroeconomic effects 
of the implementation of the capital requirements was oriented to the identification of 
the relationship between the credit volume fluctuations (and consequently the economic 
output) and the more restrictive capital regulation. Likewise, Van den Heuvel (008) 
calculated that the compliance with capital requirements leads to a permanent loss in the 
volume of consumption in the United States in the range of from 0.% to %. 
On the other hand, the bank capital channel works out only if the following assumptions 
are satisfied (Francis and Osborne, 2009b:1): if banks do not have a sufficient capital buffer 
through which they could insulate themselves from the movements in the credit supply 
when regulatory changes occur; if capital enlargement is a costly process; if economic 
agents are highly dependable upon bank loan financing. If the phenomena of demand-driven 
and supply-driven credit rationing are taken into consideration, the macroeconomic effects 
of  “adequate” capitalization might be an argument for a reasonable or, on the other hand, a 
more stringent criticism of the (supra)national prudential authorities. Thus, the importance 
of principles and practice of the occurrence of business and economic cycles is temporarily 
downgraded, while primacy in the explanations of movements in the aggregate credit and 
investment level is given to the effects of the capital requirements or to the supply side of 
the process. It is in this sense that the phrase capital crunch is used to indicate the cause 
of pro-cyclicality or, to be more precise, the contraction in credit activities, particularly 
in the case of more weakly capitalised banks and of loan categories assigned with high 
risk weights (for example, loans to small and medium-sized firms, which are anyway 
highly dependent on bank financing). However, the capital requirements are not the 
only relevant factor of the credit activity level and structure, and recent researches with 
inconsistent conclusions brought this issue sharply into focus. Gambacorta and Mistrulli 
(2004) empirically confirm that the bank capital might cause shocks in aggregate lending; 
Brissimis and Delis (2009) prove that bank specificities cannot be the main reasons for 
the aforementioned conclusions; while Berrospide and Edge (00) verify the modest 
impact of bank capital on lending. A solution to reconcile these contradictions is modelled 
by Miyake and Nakamura (007), who ascribe to capital regulation long-term stabilising 
effects that address the macroeconomic consequences of negative shocks to productivity. 
On the other hand, in the short term it can have a pro-cyclical effect, because of which the 
tightening of capital regulation needs timing precisely; this is the key practical implication 
of their research. Generally, there are two groups of conclusions present in this type of 
research: () the implementation of capital requirements did not induce the credit shock, 
() the implementation of capital requirements combined with another supply-side and 
with demand-side determinants of the credit level contributed to the development of the 
credit shock.
For these reasons, this research does not aim to simulate or estimate the macroeconomic 
consequences of the implementation of capital requirements, indirectly throughout the 
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4 capital requirements (i.e. regulatory indicators of financial leverage, to be more precise, 
capital buffers). Additional justification for the exogenous treatment of economic trends 
in the analysis of the capital requirements efficiency is found in Quagliariello (2008), 
while Saidenberg and Schuermann (003:8) point out that if capital requirements pro-
cyclicality even exists, it is not clear how it can be confirmed. A distinction of the direct 
effects deriving from the capital requirements prescriptions from the effects induced by 
the shifts in the economic cycles remains an empirical challenge, although pro-cyclicality 
has always previously been the most tested aspect of the capital requirements effects. 
However, if the assumption of pro-cyclicality is a consequence of cyclicality is accepted 
(Quagliariello, 2008:103; Marcucci and Quagliariello, 2008), then research that explores 
the capital buffers or regulatory capital cyclicality might indirectly serve as a support for a 
certain conclusions on the macroeconomic implications of the implementation of capital 
requirements i.e. on the pro-cyclicality of capital requirements.
The size of banks’ regulatory capital is a volatile category, what might be a consequence 
of endogenous and exogenous factors. Thus, it is justified to question the role of economic 
cycles in the (non)functionality of capital requirements. Nevertheless, there are only a 
few research works that combine microeconomic or bank-specific and macroeconomic 
determinants of capital requirements volatility. With reference to the aforementioned, this 
research acknowledges the empirical background in the following papers: Bikker and Hu 
(2002), Ayuso et al. (2004), Bikker and Metzemakers (2007), Jokipii and Milne (2008), 
Stolz (2007), Francis and Osborne (2009a), and Stolz and Wedow (2011). By taking into 
consideration cyclicality in the capital itself rather than its cyclical implications, the paper 
is in line with the current trends in empirical research into the issues and challenges related 
to capital adequacy standards; theoretical and empirical findings have shown that capital 
alone cannot be held responsible for a contraction in credit activity, as used to be argued, 
irrespective of whether increases in capital requirements or shocks in capital size were 
concerned. Moreover, banks pro-cyclical behaviour might be mitigated by maintaining 
surpluses of capital above those regulatorily required (i.e. capital buffers) and with their 
accumulation in the periods of economic expansion, which is currently being promoted 
within the Basel III framework. Whatever the case might be, new versions of the afore-
mentioned regulatory concept should not be designed without empirical evidence on the 
endogenous and exogenous determinants of capital buffers cyclicality being provided 
and taken into consideration.
2  CYCLICALITY OF BANK CAPITAL BUFFERS: A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH
A certain novelty of empirical research into the interdependence between the capital 
requirements and macroeconomic trends is found in the empirical analysis of the impact 
of macroeconomic tendencies on the volatility of the regulatory capital level. Following 
the methodological framework developed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992), the changes in 
bank capitalization (ΔCAPj,t) are determined with both exogenous factors (Ẽj,t) and endo-
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43  ()
Furthermore, the discretionary changes in capital (ΔCAPMj,t) are defined as the differ-
ence between the target capital level (CAP*j,t) and the capital level in the previous period 
(CAPj,t-):
  ()
Altogether, the following equation can be written:
  (3)
where α is adjustment speed in the capital level.
The aforementioned formula takes into account the fact that banks can have deviations 
from the target capital level, i.e. that they are not always in a position to make ad hoc 
adjustments to the targeted capital levels. Thus, banks usually maintain a higher level 
of regulatory capital than that prescribed, which is also the key conclusion of the capital 
buffer theory (Milne and Whalley, 2001). The surplus of capital above the minimally 
prescribed level (by the regulators) is replaced by the formulation of capital buffer in 
the rest of the paper, with the following note in mind: prudential authorities may request 
banks that they perceive to engage in unusually high risk-taking behaviour to maintain 
a capital adequacy level higher than that which is minimally prescribed. Therefore, the 
capital buffer or the discretionary capital can be an outcome of the bank’s discretion (as 
an object of regulation), as well as, the regulator’s discretion. Whatever the case might 
be, it is evident that banks usually have the higher capital levels than those minimally 
prescribed, while the motives for the maintenance of the capital buffers might be strategic 
or reputational (Lastra, 2004:230; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2007:13; Jokipii and Milne, 
008:44), i.e. have to be supported by the following considerations:
–  cheaper refinancing and borrowing in the future, i.e. the market discipline functiona-
lity (practiced by the bank clients, creditors, credit rating agencies, shareholders),
–  avoiding the costs of regulatory interventions in case of insufficient capitaliza-
tion,
–  granting loans in a recession, i.e. reduced pro-cyclical effects of bank capital (not 
missing the chance for future bank growth),
–  financing mergers and acquisitions,
–  expansion in the business of banking,
–  a more flexible bank management, and
–  protection against unexpected losses.
Thus, banks have to weigh the costs and benefits from holding a certain level of capital 
above the minimally prescribed. In such a manner, when determining the discretionary 
capital they have to bear in mind the following costs: the remuneration cost of capital 
requested by the shareholders, the costs of the franchise value loss, the costs of reputation 
loss, bankruptcy costs, the costs of regulatory interventions and sanctions and the costs of 
adjustment to the requirements of the regulator and the market participants, for example, 
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44 other, wholesale creditors of banks (Ayuso et al., 2004:253). Consequently, the targeted 
capital level is ambiguously determined. Moreover, it is dependent upon the bank speci-
ficities, which are proxied by numerous bank-specific variables in empirical researches. 
Further, an exogenous changes of capital might be the outcome of regulatory pressures for 
an increase of capital or unexpected changes in the volume of earnings caused by operating 
income volatility or loans value impacting the level of provisioning, and is connected to 
or is, in the first place, originated by the general economic context (Shrives and Dahl, 
1992:446-447). Whatever the case might be, due to the manner in which the measure of 
capital requirements has been designed, the level of risks taken and the changes in the risk 
level ought to be reflected in the capital level. According to Shrieves and Dahl (1992) a 
positive relationship between risk and capital is explained by banks’ efforts to mitigate 
bankruptcy costs or by the risk aversion of bank managers, while a negative impact of 
risk on capital can be the consequence of oversights in the deposit insurance premiums. 
The level of risks taken is correlated with the expected or achieved return (which is an 
outcome of the size and the structure of bank activities). Altogether, this makes bank 
profitability as well as growth indicators the endogenous factors of volatility in capital 
requirements. And finally, the cyclicality of capital requirements is determined by bank 
characteristics and macroeconomic trends.
The key methodological features and conclusions of the reviewed empirical researches 
(encompassed by table ) on the exogenous determinants of capital requirements cycli-
cality can be summarized in the following points:
–  Research methodology selection. Almost all the research works reviewed employ 
dynamic panel analysis.
–   Data sample unit. Researches usually observe commercial and savings banks or 
savings banks and cooperatives (Ayuso et al., 2004; Lindquist, 2004; Stolz, 2007; 
Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Stolz and Wedow, 2011), which enables subsamples to 
be analysed and conclusions to be made as to how much capital requirements of 
various groups of credit institutions are volatile due to cyclical movements and how 
much volatility is caused by bank specificities, banking sector characteristics and 
by a given bank’s being a certain kind of credit institution. Research that focuses 
on savings banks and cooperatives usually has significantly larger data samples 
(according to number of observations) than those that take into consideration solely 
commercial banks (Boucinha and Ribeiro, 2007; Francis and Osborne, 2009a).
–   Data sample spatial characteristics. Researches that consider the banking sector of a 
certain country are the most frequent (Ayuso et al., 004; Lindquist, 004; Boucinha 
and Ribeiro, 2007; Stolz, 2007; Francis and Osborne, 2009a; Stolz and Wedow, 
2011), while Stolz (2007) and Stolz and Wedow (2011) focus solely on one region 
of one observed country, i.e. the western part of Germany, due to the disparities 
in the economic development of the two parts after the unification of the country. 
Cross-country analyses are usually related to the political or economic affiliation of 
a country to a certain association, e.g. the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2007) or the European Union 
(EU) (Jokipii and Milne, 008). An exception to this is constituted by Fonseca and 
González (2010) and Fonseca et al. (2010), who analyse the banking sectors of 70 and 
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145it can be concluded that investigations have been carried out only for developed 
countries, which means that there is an urgent need to bridge the research gap with 
respect to the banking sectors of developing countries. Interestingly, in this theme, 
research into European countries dominates, while there is little or no research related 
to the United States (except a part of the research by Jokipii and Milne, 0).
–   Data sample time period characteristics. The shortest time period range, that of 7 
years, is encompassed by Lindquist (004), while the longest time period is found in 
Ayuso et al. (2004), Bikker and Metzemakers (2007), Boucinha and Ribeiro (2007), 
Stolz (2007) and Fonseca et al. (2010) with more than 11 years encompassed by the 
data sample. Empirical researches at the level of a single country’s banking sector 
have not taken into consideration data later than the year 006 (Francis and Osborne, 
2009a).
–   Variables selection. Most of the research aims to examine the impact of macroeco-
nomic and bank-specific variables on the capital buffers which is set out as the 
dependent variable, while some researches, e.g. Bikker and Metzemakers (2007) 
and Francis and Osborne (2009a) use also the capital adequacy indicator. Other ones 
likewise Stolz (2007) or Stolz and Wedow (2011) use an indicator of regulatory 
capital over total assets or equity to total assets ratio, as do Bikker and Metzemakers 
(007). Economic trends are usually described by taking into account the real gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth.
–   Impact of economic cycles on capital requirements volatility. All research (at the 
level of the overall sample, as there are some differences in the subsample approach) 
confirmed that capital buffers increase in an economic downturn, and that they tend 
to decrease in periods of economic expansion.
–   Other conclusions. Commercial banks have lower capital buffers than savings banks 
and/or cooperatives (Lindquist, 004). In addition, the results reveal a positive 
relationship between capital buffers and economic growth in small banks and in 
cooperatives (Jokipii and Milne, 008) due to the earnings-retaining policy of these 
credit institutions in periods of expansion and a slower growth of placements (and thus 
the risk-weighted assets) as they mainly finance themselves with their core deposits. 
Jokipii and Milne (2008) confirmed that there is a difference in the cyclicality of 
capital buffers between the newly acceded countries and the older member countries 
of the European Union; in the older member countries there is a negative correlation 
between capital buffers and economic growth, while in the newly acceded countries 
there is a positive correlation.
According to the presented research findings, it is evident that there is a gap in the 
empirical literature on the research issue for the South-Eastern European countries. In 
fact, as the capital adequacy standard was aimed at the most developed countries, or 
rather, at internationally active banks originating in these countries, it is explainable why 
research works for those countries outnumber those for developing countries, which 
adopted the Basel Committee recommendations in their national regulatory acts at a 
later date. However, numerous researchers warn that the effects and implementation of 
capital requirements might be significantly different in countries at different economic 
development levels (e.g. Caprio and Honohan, 1999; Morisson and White, 2005). This 
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150 3  EMPIRICAL RESEARCH CONCERNING THE BANKING SECTORS OF SOUTH-
EASTERN EUROPE
3.1. DATA, METHODOLOGY AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT
Empirical research into the endogenous and exogenous determinants of the cyclicality 
of capital buffers has been carried out on a data sample of commercial banks from the 
9 South-Eastern European countries that were active in the period from 2000-2010 and 
whose financial statements and financial indicators (which serve as approximations of 
the endogenous aspects of capital buffers cyclicality) were available in the Bankscope 
database. A distribution of banks by countries in the selected data set is given in the 
appendix (table A).
Table 2 
Data sources for the groups of indicators
Variable Explanation                                  and/or                  Data source
Microeconomic indicators
Microeconomic, i.e. financial, indicators of banks in the period 
from 000-00 were selected in the data sample according to 
the geographical criteria (Balkan States), status (active banks), 
type (commercial banks) and financial statements 
consolidation code (banks with consolidated (C and C) and 
unconsolidated statements (U)).
Bankscope, Bureau van Dijk
Banking sector indicators
minCAP
Minimally prescribed capital adequacy ratio  
(for all the countries the officially prescribed 
indicator is taken into consideration, while for 
Romania in 2009 and 2010 the required rate is 
proxied by the IMF recommendations of 0%, 
due to the non-transparency of this information 
on the official website of the central bank of that 
country for the observed years). Minimally 
prescribed capital adequacy ratios by countries 
are encompassed in table A in the appendix.
Official websites of central 
banks by countries (various 
publications and decisions), the 
European Central Bank, annual 
publication Transition report in 
the period 000-00, 
Wisniwski (2005), Barisitz and 
Gardó (008), Jokipii and Milne 
(008), Athanasoglou (0)
E_A Equity to assets ratio for the observed banking sector
The World Bank (World 
Development Indicators & 
Global Development Finance)
Macroeconomic indicator
GDP growth Annual rate of growth of gross domestic product 
The World Bank (World 
Development Indicators & 
Global Development Finance)
Dummy variables
Dummy variable for an economic cycle (growth – dyEXP, 
downturn – dyREC) 
Δ GDP (%) £ 0 (downturn – 
recession)
Δ GDP (%) > 0 (growth – 
expansion)
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151Banking sector indicators and macroeconomic indicators are taken from the official web-
sites of central banks of the countries encompassed by the data sample as well as from the 
World Bank. Detailed insight into the data sources for the groups of indicators is provided 
in table . By taking into consideration the empirical background, an econometric model 
which encompassed the microeconomic variables from table 3 was developed. All the 
selected variables report annual values. The data were taken in euros, while delta (Δ) 
stands for the first difference of the observed variable value in order to cover the absolute 
changes in the variable in the two successive periods.
Table 3 
Definition of banks financial indicators employed in the econometric model
Variable Explanation Group of indicators
ABBUFF
Absolute value of capital buffer = 
Bank capital adequacy ratio – 




Non-performing (bad debt) and 
partially performing loans / Total 
loans
Credit risk (asset risk) 
indicator
ROA Return on assets Overall profitability indicator
GROWL Growth of loans Growth indicator
LLR_L
Loan loss reserves (identified and 




Undercapitalized banks in 









a  If a bank’s regulatory capital (capital adequacy ratio) is higher than the minimally prescribed plus a stand-
ard deviation of the minimally prescribed capital adequacy ratio, a bank is perceived to be a well-capital-
ized one (dydevBUFWell). In the opposite case, it is held to be under-capitalized (dydevBUFLow).
b  If a bank equity to assets ratio is higher than the average value of the aforementioned indicator for 
the banking sector in which a bank operates, a bank is perceived to be well-capitalized (WELLCA). 
In the opposite case it is considered undercapitalized (LOWCA).
Source: Author’s presentation.
The empirical research employed the econometric method of dynamic panel models. The 
collected secondary data have a time and spatial component, and a suitable data analysis 
method is thus an econometric method of panel analysis. Namely, use of the simple multiple 
regression is not possible as it cannot be assumed that there is an independence between 
the observations of one observed item during a time period (Škrabić, 2009:14). Thus, in 
a situation of the analysis of bank financial indicators, the indicators of one period are 
dependent on the same indicators in the previous period, i.e. there is a process of the first-
order autoregression. “The dynamic panel models contain the dependent variable which is 
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152 are characterized with a larger number of groups (N) than the time component (t), which 
this method handles very well. The empirical estimation of the panel data was performed 
using the dynamic panel model, to be more precise with the GMM (generalized method of 
moments) Arellano-Bond two-step estimator as well as the GMM Blundell-Bond two-step 
estimator. In the empirical work on the research issue both the “difference” GMM Arellano-
Bond and the “system” GMM Blundell-Bond estimator as a certain improvement of the 
Arellano-Bond in a case in which the autoregressive parameter value is near to one, and 
the number of observations is relatively small, were used. The preliminary data analysis 
using the Arellano-Bond estimator gave sufficient reasons for employing the improved 
estimator. By using the Arellano-Bond estimator the values of the lagged dependent va-
riables were below 0.15 at worst. However, the specificities of the models in which the 
dependent variables were the first differences (absolute changes – Δ) of selected financial 
indicators, and where lagged absolute values of the same variables were used as independent 
variables, ask for an additional analysis if the estimated parameters of the aforementioned 
independent variables are high. Additional analysis can be obtained by dropping the va-
riable from the model or by employing the Blundell-Bond estimator when there is large 
number of groups. Thus, from this point forward, only the Blundell-Bond estimations of 
the econometric model will be presented. The model’s quality is evaluated using the tests 
which are usually applied in the dynamic panel analysis likewise Sargan’s test as well as 
autocorrelation tests. The data were analysed in the statistical package STATA .
The dynamic panel model for the selected variables is given with the following equation:
 (4)
where i denotes an individual and t denotes time, μ is an intercept, γ is a parameter of the 
lagged dependent variable, β1, β2,..., βK are the parameters of the exogenous variables, xit 
are independent variables, αi is an individual-specific effect and εit the error term. 
The basic dynamic panel model on the dependence of changes in the banks’ capital buffers 
upon endogenous aspects has the following form:
 
(5)
The exogenous aspects of the macroeconomic variables influence are approximated with 
the dummy variables and various interaction terms. Namely, due to the small number of 
groups and observations for certain countries, the traditional use of the GDP growth rate 
and other macroeconomic variables was not an advisable solution.
3.2 RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
The descriptive data of the selected model variables precede the estimations of the eco-
nometric models. The mean value of the capital buffers (absolute level) has continuou-
sly decreased since the year 2001 (figure 1). This might lead to the conclusion that the 
South-Eastern European banks have used their capital buffers, i.e. that they have increa-
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153capital. Namely, when looking at the figure it is clear that the mean value of the ratio of 
risk-weighted assets to total assets was continuously on the increase until the year 2009, 
after which it started to decline. Besides, in certain countries minimally prescribed capital 
adequacy ratios increased, which serves as an additional explanation of tendencies for the 
capital buffers to decrease. In the year 2001 the mean value of the capitalization for the 
data-sample banks was 7 percentage points higher than the minimally prescribed value, 
while in the year 2010 the equivalent figure was less than 7 percentage points.
Figure 1 
The mean values of capital buffers (ABBUFF), the ratio of non-performing loans 












2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010





According to the figure 1 a conclusion on the cyclical movement of the ratio of non-
performing loans can be made. A quality improvement of the credit portfolio of the data 
sample banks is evident after the year 2002, what represents the first considerable effects 
of liberalization and almost completed ownership transformation of the banking sectors 
of the data-sample countries. A quality of credit receivables is getting worse in the last 
two observed years and reaches the mean value of 4%, as it was in the year 000. The 
lowest mean value of the non-performing loans to total loans was below 6% what was 
recorded in the years 2005 and 2006. When looking at the figure it is clear that there is 
cyclicality in the movement of capital buffers and in the variable which approximates a 
credit risk as the potential key bank-specific determinant of capital buffer.
The ratio of loan loss reserves continuously falls down over the period 000-006 from the 
level slightly lower than 12% to the level of about 5% (figure 2). The reserves were stagna-
ting, from 006 to 008 and in the last two observed years they rose up to the level of about 
7%. These movements correspond to the impaired loans movements. The fact on the most 
of the bad loans being originated in good times makes the credit growth rates interesting 
for an observation. It is evident that the credit portfolio of the data sample banks was on 
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154 is on the level of just 10%. Although on the descriptive level, the aforementioned confirms 
the thesis on the credit activity “freezing” or the so called credit crunch as a radical form of 
the credit rationing process in the presence of the global financial crisis, and in the South-
Eastern European area the shift towards negative economic tendencies with a stronghold in 
the serious structural problems. With reference to profitability (figure 3) it is observable that 
the mean value of the return on assets for the data-sample banks was higher than 0.5% until 
2008, while from 2009 onwards that indicator is being zero or has a negative value.
Figure 2 
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GROW L (right) _LLR   L (left)
Source: Bankscope.
Figure 3 
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155Table 4 



























































































































No. of  
observations
66 66 66 66 66 66
No. of banks 88 88 88 88 88 88
Sargan test  
(p-value)








0.6785 0.6655 0.5902 0.6785 0.7594 0.4495
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, * statistically 
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156 Table 5 
Panel data estimation of developed model with changes in capital buffers as 
dependent variable


























































No. of observations 66 66 66
No. of banks 88 88 88
Sargan test (p-value) 0.0966 0.0925 0.3385
First-order autocorrelation (p-value) 0.08 0.076 0.0040
Second-order autocorrelation (p-value) 0.4980 0.3948 0.46
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, * statistically signifi-
cant at 10% level. 
Source: Author’s calculation.
In the empirical estimation of the exogenous determinants of the cyclicality of the ca-
pital buffers, already specified the basic model has been supplemented with the dummy 
variables and various interaction terms which reflect the economic environment. As the 
years 007 and 008 are perceived to be the breaking points between the periods of the 
financial and economic stability and distress in the financial system functionality as well as 
indicating a  shift towards economic downturn (as evident from the previous figures), the 
models have been supplemented with dummy variables for the years 007 and 008. Apart 
from that, the dummy variables that represent the periods of recession and expansion were 
used in the following way: positive GDP percentage changes stand for an expansionary 
period, while negative percentage changes denote a period of recession. With reference 
to this, and taking into consideration the empirical background, annual GDP growth and 
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157in practice it is common to use two successive annual (percentage) GDP changes in order 
to reach a conclusion of whether an expansion or a recession is involved.
The empirical results of the estimated models with the changes in the capital buffers set 
out as a dependent variable obtained with the Blundell-Bond estimator are presented in 
the tables 4 and 5. From the correlation matrices given in the appendix it is clear that 
independent variables are not strongly correlated, except for some interaction variables, 
which are thus not simultaneously included in the model. In the model, which contains 
dy2007, the appearance of the variable dydevBUFWellit  instead of dydevBUFLowit does 
not cause a sizeable deviation in results. Namely, the difference is visible in the sign of 
estimated parameter of this variable which becomes a positive one, while the constant 
term has a somewhat lower-estimated parameter and is statistically insignificant. Analysis 
shows that well-capitalized banks dominate within the sample, due to the results of the 
model with dydevBUFWellit * dy2007 and of the model with dy2007 being almost equal. 
Besides the presented models, models with other possible combinations of interaction 
terms were estimated, but those results are not presented here, as those variables which 
were assumed to improve the basic model were statistically insignificant. In addition, 
estimations of the data subsamples in which the economic cycle, i.e. the existence of 
expansion or recession was the criterion variable for the data subsampling were made. 
The results of the latter approach are given in the appendix (table A3). 
3.3. INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH RESULTS 
The lagged dependent variable DABBUFFi,t–1, lagged value of capital buffers ABBUFFi,t–1 
and credit growth GROWLit are in a negative relationship with the changes in capital buf-
fers, while the changes in the non-performing loans DNPL_L it, the return on assets ROAit 
and the ratio of loan loss reserves LLR_Lit have a positive sign of the estimated parameters. 
From figure 1, which shows the movement of the capital buffers volume in the observed 
period, a negative sign of the lagged dependent variable was somewhat expected: since 
the year 00 onwards, a continuous decrease in the mean value of capital buffers was 
recorded. Analogously to this, the empirical estimation results confirmed that the lagged 
variable ABBUFFi,t–1 has a statistical significance and that the estimated parameter has a 
negative sign. The conclusion can be made that the growth of capital buffers in one period 
will have a negative impact on the capital buffers in the following period, i.e. the growth 
of capital buffers in one period leads to a decrease in the capital buffers in the following 
period and vice versa. This might be a consequence of the risk-weighted assets being 
increased and/or an increase in the minimally prescribed capital adequacy ratio, which 
occurred in certain South-Eastern European countries in the observed period (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia).
All models report a positive influence of the changes in non-performing loans DNPL_L it 
on the changes in capital buffers, which might be interpreted in the following way: with 
an increase in the credit portfolio riskiness, banks increase capital buffers and vice versa. 
The mean value of capital buffers was continuously falling in the observed period, while 
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158 008 this has exponentially increased up to the level of the mean value from the begin-
ning of the observed period (figure 1). Thus, according to the graphical presentation, no 
conclusion that an increase in the riskiness of assets caused an increase in the capital 
buffers can be made. On the contrary, a decrease in the riskiness of assets contributed to 
a reduction in capital buffers. In addition, subsamples analysis (table A3 in the appendix) 
reveals that in the period of economic expansion there is no significant linkage between 
the changes in the non-performing loans and the changes in capital buffers, while in the 
recessionary period there is a certain level of significance. Bank profitability measured 
by return on assets ROAit positively drives the changes in the bank capital buffers. The 
higher the return on assets, the higher the capital buffers and vice versa, a decrease in 
bank profitability reduces the capital buffers, which is logical if the bank regulatory 
capital structure is borne in mind. These tendencies are even more noticeable during 
economic expansion than in recession, and the estimated parameters from the table A3 
in the appendix clearly serve as a proof.
In the presented estimations, the sign of the estimated parameter of the lagged value of 
capital buffers ABBUFFi,t–1 is negative and significant. During the whole period the mean 
value of capital buffers was ., i.e. the banks had capital adequacy that was . 
percentage points on average higher than that minimally prescribed. Thus, a gradual 
“spending” of the capital surplus is expected. The aforementioned confirms the practice 
of having periods of capital accumulation and periods of capital “consumption”. For the 
observed data set the accumulation of capital above that regulatorily required occurred in 
the years 00 and 00 or even earlier, and after that the process of capital spending, i.e. 
a decrease in the capital buffers took place. Thus the value of capital buffers was “only” 
6.88708 percentage points on average at the end of 00. Finally, it can be concluded 
that banks with higher initial capital buffers endeavour to maintain these levels, while 
the banks with the lower capital buffers tend to build up their levels of regulatory capital, 
which adds up to an empirical verification of the capital buffer theory.
The ratio of loan loss reserves LLR_Lit has a positive sign, which implies that an increase/
decrease of reserves leads to an increase/decrease of capital buffers. This relationship is 
partly explainable by the fact that reserves, in a certain measure, contribute to a buildup 
process of regulatory capital (directly throughout the special reserves for unidentified 
losses in the supplementary capital I). Nevertheless, most of the loan loss reserves are the 
reserves for identified losses, whose costs are a deductible item in the income statement, 
and thus, indirectly, through their influence on profit, contribute to the regulatory capital 
variations. Therefore, an alternative interpretation is possible. The figure on the mean value 
of the ratio of loan loss reserves shows a long period of the ratio being decreased, together 
with the continuous fall of the capital buffers (figure 2). That is, a radical decline in the 
ratio of loan loss reserves is partially an outcome of the so called process of “cleaning” 
the credit portfolios of bad debt (i.e. exclusion of the bad debt from the banks’ balance 
sheets) which happened in the years of the observed banking sectors’ restructuration and 
rehabilitation (in the years 2000 and 2001). With reference to this, the average value of the 
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159after which it remained at the same or a somewhat lower level. At the same time, after a 
sizeable growth of the capital buffers (in the first two observed years), a long period in 
their decline followed. Thus, in a period of a small frequency of the occurrence of risk 
events (loans charge-offs, costs recognition and value adjustments of reserves, due to an 
increase in non-performing loans), banks reduce their capital buffers, aimed at diminishing 
the effects of the unexpected losses. By taking into consideration a synchronization of the 
variables of the non-performing loans and the loan loss reserves as well as the appearance 
of a credit expansion in the period of their decrease (from 00-007), and on the contrary 
the appearance of the credit crunch in the period of their increase (from 007-00), a 
conclusion on the banks’ perceptions of credit risk and the pro-cyclicality of their credit 
activity can be made. Thus, a decline in the banks’ capital buffers is the consequence of 
a long period of expansive credit policies on the part of the banks, which are connected 
to their perceptions of reduced credit risks and the occurrence of risk events, and which 
are altogether reflected in their provisioning policies and loans classifications into groups 
according to their quality. 
Obviously, the changes (to be more precise, the droop in the observed data set) in the banks’ 
capital buffers can be explained in various ways. Besides the aforementioned factors, like 
a decrease in profitability or recorded losses, an increase in the risk-weighted assets as well 
as the minimally prescribed capital adequacy ratio, there is also the reason of the growth of 
loans. Empirical findings confirmed that the growth of loans GROWLit leads to a decrease 
in the capital buffers, due to an increase in the banks’ exposures, i.e. the volume of the 
risk-weighted assets when there is a speed-up in credit growth. Furthermore, the size of the 
banks’ capital buffers may vary due to the changes in the structure of exposures. A threat 
from the so called cosmetic adjustments of the capital adequacy ratio (i.e. the unchanged 
regulatory capital) or even from the false impressions of an increase in the capital buffers, 
due to loans being made to economic agents with lower risk-weights in crisis episodes, 
requires additional attention when the dynamics of the capital buffers movements are being 
explained. Namely, the maintenance of capital buffers at a certain level, besides by an 
increase in the regulatory capital, might be driven by the following factors: a decrease in 
the risk-weighted assets, a credit “freezing” process, continuity of recording profits and 
their reinvestment as well as by raising the minimally prescribed capital adequacy ratio. 
Thus, in the banking sectors that experienced periods of extremely large recapitalizations 
(e.g. the large banks in Croatia after an introduction of the marginal obligatory reserve) it is 
realistic to expect a further decrease in the capital buffers. Nevertheless, the credit crunch 
caused by the accumulated structural problems of the observed economies contributed to 
the capital buffers being enlarged in the recession period.
The year 2007 positively influenced the changes in the capital buffers. Until 2007 capital 
buffers were, on average, trending down on a yearly basis. A slowdown in the credit 
growth that took place after the year 007 as well as a slowdown in the growth of risk-
weighted assets, due to the shift in lending activity favouring economic agents whose 
debt is assigned lower risk weights (e.g. the governmental sector), explain the tendency 
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60 the regulatory pressures for an increase in capital is proxied by the two types of dummy 
variables that are interchangeably employed in the models, as well as the interaction terms 
which contain those dummy variables. The first approximation is set out in form of the 
banks with a lower or a higher capitalization in comparison to the minimally prescribed 
capital adequacy ratios for the country (dydevBUFLow and dydevBUFWell). The second 
one differentiates banks with a lower or a higher equity to assets ratio in comparison to 
a mean value of a certain banking sector in which the bank operates (LOWCA and WEL-
LCA). Most of the banks from the South-Eastern European area were well-capitalized, 
which is supported by the fact of the sizeable capital buffers. That caused a number of 
options for a definition and analysis of the regulatory pressure impact as being rather 
small. Thus, the methodology that is regularly applied in the empirical background is 
borrowed in this paper. With reference to this, banks with a capitalization that is lower 
than or equal to that which is regulatorily required are treated as the banks under regulatory 
pressures, while banks that according to that criterion were well-capitalized were banks 
without regulatory pressures. Although this logic may be absolutely justified soon after 
the capital requirements standard was put into effect, when there was a substantial number 
of undercapitalized banks, a familiarity with the characteristics of banking sectors of the 
observed countries serves as a support for the conclusion that weakly capitalized banks are 
usually large banks or those that are “too big to fail”, while the banks with extremely high 
capitalization are usually small-sized banks (for which there was a poor data continuity 
in the available financial indicators), which do not serve prime customers, but most often 
riskier clients. However, that knowledge might contribute to the economic interpretation of 
the research findings. As was earlier pointed out, there were more well-capitalized banks 
(dydevBUFWell) than weakly capitalized banks (dydevBUFLow) in the data set, when the 
benchmark is the minimally prescribed capital adequacy ratio. In the case of the second 
dummy variables group (LOWCA and WELLCA) the differences between the subsamples’ 
size with reference to capitalization were not so remarkable. The obtained results confirm 
that the banks which are assumed to be under the regulatory pressure (dydevBUFLow) 
had a greater drop in the capital buffers. A literal and isolated approach would lead to a 
conclusion that bank capital requirements regulation did not add to the banks’ capitaliza-
tion, i.e. that it did not fulfill its purpose. On the other hand, if there is an understanding 
that accumulation and consumption of capital are carried out in phases or cycles, and that 
in the observed data sample a decreasing trend in the capital buffers was recorded, then 
the obtained results are expected. If lower capitalization is linked to the larger banks, the 
estimated direction of influence is even clearer. This implies the following conclusion: the 
weakly capitalized banks at least maintained a certain capitalization level, as the volume 
of loans and the risk-weighted assets was continuously increasing during the observed 
period. Thus, capital adequacy regulation is not irrelevant, as might be concluded from 
the research results. Furthermore, the weakly capitalized banks could be perceived as the 
most efficient ones in terms of the cost of capital, as they keep the required capitalization 
at the minimum level, as do those whose market position obviously ensures them fast 
and successful recapitalization if necessary in periods of economic expansion, which is in 
contrast to the understanding that those banks are under regulatory pressures. Thus, higher 
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6and volatile secondary financial funds of the small-sized banks are borne in mind, which 
altogether has to be compensated with substantial capital surpluses.
Using the interaction terms LOWCAit * dyREC and dydevBUFLowit * dyREC it is found 
out that the capital buffers of the weakly capitalized banks decrease in the recession 
period. This is additionally confirmed for well-capitalized banks (dydevBUFWellit * 
dyREC * ABBUFFi,t–1). A particularly negative influence on the changes in capital buffers 
was recorded in the year 008 (variable dydevBUFLowit * dy2008). On the other hand, 
well-capitalized banks, which dominate the sample, in the expansion periods reduce 
their capital buffers (dydevBUFWellit * dyEXP * ABBUFFi,t–1). To sum up, it might be 
concluded that at the data set level, capital buffers are continuously trending downwards, 
which is driven not only by the banks’ specificities, but also by the general economic 
conditions.
4 CONCLUSION
The initial introduction of capital requirements was followed by a radical decrease in the 
aggregate credit level, and thus the problem of the capital requirements pro-cyclicality 
was heavily exploited and empirically examined in the 1990s. Nevertheless, when it is 
learned that the changes in the aggregate volume of loans could be also explained by 
some other effects, apart from the effect of regulatory restrictions, the cyclicality of the 
capital requirements begins to be more at the focus of research. Requirements for the 
better capitalization of banks regularly occur in periods of economic distress. In such 
times, the volume of the partially collectable and non-performing loans increase and 
with the drop in banks’ credit and investment activity, their profitability declines. In the 
aforementioned circumstances, credit and market risks enlarge, recapitalizations are less 
available, while deposits stagnate or in an even worse case they decline. All this leads 
to credit and, most often, equity rationing as well as fire sales of securities portfolios. In 
that case, the volume of the “free” regulatory capital or the capital buffers may neutralize 
any impairment of the key elements of the banking stability. Thus, it is rather important 
empirically to identify what drives the volume of the banks’ capital buffers. The discovery 
that there has been no empirical research into the determinants of changes in the capital 
buffers of South-Eastern European banks inspired this research.
Empirical research into South-Eastern Europe confirmed that there is a certain amount 
of evidence for the cyclicality of changes in the capital buffers, which is an outcome 
of the financial characteristics of the observed banks, as well as the economic environ-
ment. In periods of economic expansion, banks increase their capital the most often as 
a consequence of market pressures and their appetites for risk taking, while in econo-
mic downturns or crisis periods, banks usually have to increase their capital due to the 
regulatory pressures. Meanwhile, the risk undertaken in the previous periods is already 
significantly being materialized. The research into South-Eastern Europe reveals that the 
changes in the level of the credit risks taken, as well as an increase in the profitability and 
the loan loss reserves, positively determine changes in the banks’ capital buffers, while 
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6 pital buffers. Furthermore, the capital buffers increase in only certain years of economic 
expansion, while during the recession they tend to decrease continuously. Although the 
applied methodology is not completely comparable to the earlier empirical estimations 
in the part of an approximation of the economic cycle, the conclusion can be made that 
the obtained results are comparable to the empirical background. Notwithstanding the 
initial capitalization level, banks mainly reduced their capital buffers over the observed 
period. Thus, an affirmation of the counter-cyclical capital buffers seems to be an adequate 
direction in the capital adequacy standard development. Nevertheless, a question can be 
asked as to the repercussions from the implementation of counter-cyclical capital buffers, 
as well as from the changes of the regulatory capital structure towards a higher share of 
the Tier  capital. Namely, the cost of capital is an integral part in loan pricing, and thus 
it remains questionable what the implications of the mentioned regulatory restrictions 
will be in addition to those from the selected or regulatory required capital buffers to the 
risk and return of banks with a time lag. The importance of getting an empirical answer 
to this question for South-Eastern European countries is additionally supported by the 
high risk premiums of the observed countries, which enlarge the cost of capital and other 
financing sources of banks in the crisis periods. Thus, there is a great challenge for the 
prudential authorities in their attempts to maintain the banking sectors’ stability, which 
can be summarized in the following: with the discussed regulatory changes, they must 
not encourage banks to adjustments in their operations such as to reveal the counter- 
effectiveness of the regulatory actions in the long-term.
 Examinations show that the risk-free rate (which reflects the country risk premium) in the estimations of 
the cost of equity capital, using the CAPM model, represents up to /3 of the overall cost of the bank equity 
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63APPENDIX
Table a1 
Distribution of banks by countries in the selected data sample












Required regulatory minimum in the capital adequacy ratio in the South-Eastern 
European countries in observed years
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Albania           
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
0 0 0        
Bulgaria           
Greece 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Macedonia 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Romania        8 8 0 0
Serbia  8 8 8 8 0     
Slovenia 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Source: Official websites of central banks across countries (various publications and decisions), ECB, 
annual publication Transition report in the period from 2000-2010, Wisniwski (2005), Barisitz and 
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66 Table a3 
Subsamples results when economic trend is criterion variable for the data 
subsampling (REC is for recession, EXP is for expansion)



































Number of observations 105 6
Number of banks 75 73
Sargan test (p-value) 0.487 0.487
First-order autocorrelation (p-value) 0.0658 0.0658
Second-order autocorrelation  
(p-value)
0.9297 0.9297
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, * statistically signifi-
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